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Taking advantage of the ability to identify immigrants who were unauthorized to work prior to 
obtaining Legal Permanent Resident status, we use the New Immigrant Survey to examine 
whether lacking legal status to work in the U.S. constrains employment outcomes of illegal 
immigrants. With the exception of high-skilled unauthorized immigrants, the data fail to reveal 
evidence of improved employment outcomes attributable to legal status. In light of evidence 
that unauthorized immigrants experienced increased wages as a result of receiving amnesty 
through the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act during the 1990s, we interpret the 
results as evidence of ineffective employer sanctions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 1986 Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) with the 
intention of curtailing the inflow of unauthorized immigrant workers.  The framers of IRCA 
pursued a three-pronged strategy. First, a general amnesty for those unauthorized workers 
meeting certain residence or work requirements wiped the slate clean for the millions of 
undocumented immigrants already established in the country. Second, the legislation imposed 
sanctions on employers that hire unauthorized immigrants, attempting to remove the lure of 
higher-paying employment for would-be unauthorized workers.  Third, the legislation provided 
more funds for border enforcement, in an effort to make it more difficult to enter the country 
without proper documentation. By all measures, IRCA failed to achieve its key objective.  Since 
IRCA’s enactment, the undocumented immigrant population has grown from about 3 million to 
close to 12 million in 2008 (Passel and Cohn, 2009).  
The general public is deeply—and often vociferously—concerned about the effects 
unauthorized immigrants may have on the economy.  Policymakers continue to face difficult 
decisions about whether and how to legalize some of these immigrants, weighing the costs and 
benefits of doing so.  As with IRCA, an important factor in their consideration is the effect that 
legalization will have on employment outcomes. Earnings are likely to be lower and job 
opportunities limited if legal status cause undocumented workers to face difficulties in obtaining 
jobs which effectively utilize their skills. Removing these barriers would then lead to higher 
earnings and possibly productivity gains.  
A consistent picture of employment gains to legalization emerges from the research based 
on IRCA, although the magnitudes of the effects vary substantially. Estimates of the wage effect 
(as measured in 1992, about four years after receiving legal status) using survey data from the 
Legalized Population Survey (LPS) find gains for men of between 6 and 15 percent (Rivera-
Batiz, 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002 and Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Rafael, 
2007). Wage gains are also found in recent studies using the 1990 Census; Pan (2010) puts the 
wage legalization benefit among men at about 12 percent while Barcellos (2010) provides a more 
modest estimate of about 6 percent. Further evidence that lacking legal status impedes 
employment outcomes is provided by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2000) who finds indication of 
upward occupational mobility among unauthorized immigrant men who received amnesty. 2 
 
Not surprisingly given the abundance of evidence of legalization employment gains, many 
assume that if a new amnesty were to be granted to today’s working population of unauthorized 
immigrants, these workers would generally enjoy higher earnings and better job matches as a 
result, with the potential for a widespread economic boost (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2010 and Pastor et 
al, 2010). However, some new research based on more recent survey data suggest that caution 
for such optimism is warranted. For example, in a study of agricultural workers, Pena (2010) 
concludes that “that a new legalization program would have minimal effects on the earnings of 
currently undocumented farm workers as they transition to legal employment’ (p.2). 
Furthermore, both Pan (2010) and Barcellos (2010) provide evidence that the positive wage 
effects among workers who obtained legal status through IRCA dissipated over time. However, 
the latter two studies rely on data from sources such as the Census, American Community 
Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) which do not contain information on 
legal status. In sum, the effects of legal status on employment outcomes in today’s labor market 
are unclear. 
In this paper we take advantage of new data that allows for direct identification of 
unauthorized immigrant workers to assess whether unauthorized immigrants are likely to 
experience upward occupational mobility or wage gains from receiving legal status. We argue 
that the IRCA based estimated employment effects may not provide a good basis for which to 
base our expectations of the labor market effect of a new legalization program for two reasons. 
First, relying on IRCA to identify the causal labor market impact of legalization is challenging 
since relevant comparison groups are themselves likely to be affected by the large scale amnesty 
and employer sanctions and that the earnings of unaffected groups, i.e. natives, may grow 
differently over time. Second, and maybe more importantly, it is also possible that the role of 
employer sanctions has changed and that it is no longer an effective deterrent. This may be due 
to lax enforcement combined with widespread availability of false work authorization 
documents.  
We analyze how receiving Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) status affects occupational 
mobility and wages of individuals who previously worked illegally in the U.S. and whether LPR 
status allow them to obtain jobs in more desirable occupations and/or to increase wages. To do 
so we use recent data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and explore whether such potential 
effects differ between workers who crossed the border illegally and workers who violated the 3 
 
terms of a temporary visa. Importantly the NIS sample is rich enough to allow for tests of 
differences in legalization effects by skills and is not restricted to Mexican and Central American 
immigrants. Although legal status is not exogenously determined in the NIS sample we provide 
numerous robustness checks of our results and discuss the directions of potential biases in our 
estimates.  
We find that improvements in employment outcomes from a new legalization program are 
likely to be small, and possibly zero—at least in the short run. Specifically, the employment 
outcomes of immigrants who cross the border without documentation do improve over time, but 
none of these improvements are attributable to gaining legal status.  These immigrants are 
typically low-skilled workers with little education and lacking proficiency in the English 
language.  On the other hand, those immigrants who gain legalization after violating the terms of 
a temporary visa are likely to demonstrate some occupational mobility that may be related to 
acquiring legal status.  On average, these workers are more highly skilled than those who cross 
the border illegally.  The differences we observe in occupational earnings growth between these 
two groups of unauthorized immigrants are specifically attributable to their differences in skill: 
We find that highly skilled immigrants in both groups exhibit occupational improvements after 
gaining legal status.   
The paper is organized in the following way. We discuss relevant existing research in section 
2, introduce our data in section 3 and show descriptive statistics in section 4. The empirical 
method is presented in section 5, results are discussed in section 6 and lastly, in section 7 we 
provide a summary with our conclusions. 
 
2.  Previous Research 
Most of the existing studies have in common that they take advantage of the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and that they find an earnings penalty for 
undocumented status and an increase in earnings resulting from legalization, often with varying 
results by gender and differing returns to English skills and other human capital. Studies have 
applied various methods utilizing mostly the Legalized Population Survey (LPS), a panel dataset 
of formerly undocumented immigrants who received legal status under IRCA. These data have 
the advantage that survey respondents are observed in the working population before and after 
legalization. One challenge faced, though, is how to construct a suitable comparison group of 4 
 
legal immigrants whose earnings can be meaningfully compared to those of the newly legalized 
group.  
Rivera-Batiz (1999) uses the LPS to examine the earnings of undocumented Mexican 
workers. He then uses the 1990 census to compare these with the earnings of the overall 
Mexican-born working population in the U.S. This analysis reveals a wage penalty of 14 and 26 
percentage points for men and women, respectively, vis-à-vis the comparable legal working 
population. He goes on to compare the earnings of legalized immigrants earnings pre- and post-
IRCA, finding an increase of 13 percentage points for men and 17 for women. 
 Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) also examine the effect of the IRCA legalizations, 
employing the LPS to focus on the earnings of Mexican and Central American men. They use 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to construct a comparison group of Latino 
men, and estimate the wage penalty for unauthorized status to be between 14 and 24 percent. 
They estimate the earnings benefit of legalization to be a rather modest six percent, and they 
attribute these gains to increased occupational mobility – in particular, an enhanced ability to 
secure employment that rewards human capital such as English or formal education. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak and Raphael (2007) also use the LPS and NLSY to estimate the 
legalization effects of IRCA – in particular, what role occupational mobility and a change in the 
reservation wage might play in the labor force attachment of newly legalized immigrants. They 
consider the experience of both sexes and find a decrease in employment rates for men of five 
percent and a decrease in labor force participation by women of nearly seven percent. Like 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, however, they find that legalization enhances the value of 
immigrants’ human capital – particularly English skills – in commanding higher earnings. 
Both Pan (2010) and Barcellos (2010) use IRCA’s January 1, 1982 residency requirement in 
the Legally Authorized Workers (LAW) program to identify the effects of legalization. Unlike 
previous research which relied on LPS data, they utilize large nationally representative survey 
data to compare outcomes of pre-1982 arrivals to those of later arrivals. Both studies find 
positive legalization wage effects in the 1990s but also evidence that these effects diminished 
over time. Primarily due to the inability to directly identify unauthorized workers in the data, it is 
unclear whether the identified effects reflect legalization.  
Attributing the wage growth of the previously unauthorized to legalization may be 
challenging in the case of previous research. IRCA legalized nearly 3 million low-skilled 5 
 
workers, and in doing so, dramatically increased the supply of workers who were both low 
skilled and legal.  At the same time, new employer sanctions against the hiring of unauthorized 
workers were toughened.  Each of these actions could have affected both the targeted group (the 
formerly unauthorized) and the likely comparison groups: (1) the low-skilled workers who were 
legal before and after IRCA and (2) the low-skilled immigrant workers who remain unauthorized 
after IRCA.  
Comparing wages of formerly unauthorized low-skill workers to those of low-skill workers 
who were legal both before and after IRCA might make wage growth appear greater than it is. 
Because IRCA legalized so many immigrants, the supply of legal low-skilled workers may have 
increased sufficiently that, at least theoretically, the average wages of the group that was legal 
before IRCA might have actually fallen after IRCA. Thus, the gap between the two groups 
appears smaller, but in part because wages of one group have fallen while the wages of the other 
have risen. Not all can be attributed to growth in absolute wages of the formerly unauthorized.  
Similarly, the introduction of employer sanctions against the hiring of unauthorized workers 
makes employers less willing to pay unauthorized workers what they would receive in absence 
of sanctions, making this group an inappropriate comparison group as the relatively higher wages 
of previously unauthorized workers at least partly represents the worsening conditions for 
unauthorized workers.  In both instances, the result would also be an overestimation of the effect 
of legalization.  An alternative approach of using a group not affected by the amnesty may seem 
like a reasonable strategy. However, this group may differentially be affected by changes in the 
economy or other relevant factors that may change over time. 
Not surprisingly, the results of previous studies are sensitive to the choice of comparison 
group, as seen in the wide range of relative gains reported above. The study that compares 
earnings for unauthorized immigrants after legalization to, arguably, the most appropriate group 
(relatively young Latino men with limited labor market experience) finds the smallest effects of 
legalization on wages (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002).   However, even this group may have 
been negatively affected by IRCA through statistical discrimination (Bansak and Rapahel, 2001), 
and the downward pressure on the comparison group may thus lead to overstating the benefits of 
acquiring legal status.   
Our research examines legalization in an economic environment where legalization could be 
expected to have minimal effects beyond a relatively small group of immigrants experiencing a 6 
 
change in legal status—approximately 240,000 out of an estimated 7.9 million unauthorized 
immigrants in 2003 (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Recognizing that labor markets change over time 
we use more recent data from the NIS which provide a relevant comparison group in the same 
dataset – continuously legal immigrants. This group attained LPR status at the same time, and 
has the same set of demographic, human capital, employment, and immigration-related 
information, all of which is measured and reported in the same way as for the unauthorized 
worker groups. Furthermore, the unauthorized population has changed since the 1980s and now 
includes many who are not from Mexico and Central America and whose skills vary to a greater 
extent. Our sample includes workers of both genders, in various occupations, from a wide range 
of countries, who arrived in the U.S. at various points. This variety allows us to extrapolate our 
results to a wider swath of the immigrant population, more closely reflecting the current 
population of unauthorized immigrants most likely to be eligible for a future amnesty. 
  
3.  Data 
 
The data utilized in this paper come from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS). The NIS seeks 
to provide a nationally representative public-use dataset on adults and their families who have 
recently gained legal permanent residence in the United States. The NIS takes as its sampling 
frame the USCIS administrative records of all foreign-born persons admitted to LPR status. 
From this universe, a stratified sample is drawn and detailed interviews are conducted. The first 
full cohort surveyed as part of this project used a target population of 289,478 adult immigrants 
granted LPR status between May and November of 2003 (Jasso et al., 2006).  
The 2003 NIS gathered details about historical and current employment (for example, dates, 
occupation, industry, and earnings), including for U.S. jobs held before admission to LPR, and 
work authorization attained, migration history as well as standard socioeconomic information. 
To determine each immigrant’s legal status prior to earning LPR status, we look at migration and 
employment history. If a respondent reports having arrived with no documents, or with falsified 
documents, he or she is classified as a illegal border crosser or “crosser” for short If, instead, a 
respondent reports having worked while on a visa that did not permit employment, he or she is 
classified as visa abuser or “overstayer” for short. Otherwise, the respondent is classified as 
having worked legally on that pre-LPR job and is referred to as continuously legal. From these 7 
 
detailed data we are able to observe immigrants in their first U.S. jobs and soon after earning 
green cards (between 3 and 14 months). We can thus measure gains for the unauthorized relative 
to the documented in earning LPR status.   
Our analysis begins with the full sample of 8,573 completed interviews. We eliminate 
records for which key information is missing – namely, age, sex, marital and household status, 
education, and whether the respondent worked for pay before or after gaining LPR status – and 
retain 7,522 records. We then restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 
with valid responses for occupation in pre-LPR and post-LPR jobs, and who reported working in 
both periods. These restrictions yield 4,486 individuals for our occupational mobility analysis. 
Finally, requiring valid calculable wage information for both pre-and post-LPR jobs, we winnow 
down the dataset to 2,660 observations for examining hourly wages. To analyze the economic 
benefits of receiving legal status, we focus on two outcomes – median gender and occupation 
specific annual earnings and hourly wages.  
The objective with the first measure is to evaluate whether the data provides evidence that 
previously unauthorized immigrants experience upward occupational mobility as a result of 
removing the potential barrier of lacking legal status. To do so, we use gender-specific median 
earnings of foreign-born individuals by occupation, as recorded in the 2000 census, as an 
outcome measure. For each job under consideration, a census occupation code is provided. Using 
the 5% 2000 census Public Use Microdata Sample File (PUMS) data, we calculate the median 
gender-specific earnings for foreign-born persons in each occupation, then assign these earnings 
data to each job performed by each respondent. In this way, we can compare changes between 
pre- and post-LPR earnings, among former overstayers, crossers, and continuously legal 
workers. As mentioned above, the analysis using this measure may best be viewed as one of 
occupational mobility, but we frequently refer to this measure “occupational earnings.”   
This measure fails to capture earnings growth within the same occupation, or similarly 
remunerated occupation, as a result of legalization. Hence, similarly to previous research (e.g. 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002), we also examine hourly wages. Although there are several 
advantages of using this outcome measure, there are a few potential drawbacks.  
First, the data only allows us to reliably generate earnings or wages for about 60 percent of 
the sample of individuals who meet our sample restriction criteria. The reasons are either missing 
earnings information or missing information that would allow us to determine the time period the 8 
 
reported earnings refer to (i.e. per year, month or week). When we compare the sample of those 
who have reported their hourly wages to the larger sample for whom we have occupation data, 
we find little difference between the two (Hill, Lofstrom and Hayes, 2010).   
Second, because the pre-LPR status period for about one-quarter of our sample is more than 
five years prior to the interview date, we are uncertain as to whether the reported historical 
earnings information, i.e., pre-LPR wages, is accurate. Our extensive sensitivity analyses 
discussed below, addressing both the differences in the occupational earnings and wage samples 
as well as potential drawbacks with our labor market outcome measures, provide no indication 
that these issues alter the conclusions drawn in the report.  
 
4.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
We begin our analysis by comparing our sample of recent immigrants by legal experience in 
the U.S. Table 1 shows that slightly more than one-half of our occupation sample (those 
individuals who reported working in both the pre- and post-LPR period) were employed without 
authorization in the U.S. in the pre-LPR period. The percent who abused a visa, 27.6 percent, is 
just slightly greater that the proportion of illegal border crossers, 25.9 percent. 
Illegal border crossers appear to earn substantially less than their counterparts. Their group’s 
median annual earnings in their last reported U.S. occupation prior to earning LPR status average 
about $15,000, more than $4,500 less than the visa abusers, and nearly $9,000 less than the 
continuously legal group. A similar pattern holds for the first reported post-LPR occupation: the 
formerly illegal workers earn roughly $18,000 on average, compared to $23,000 for former visa 
abusers and over $25,000 for the legal group.  A simple comparison of the earnings differences, 
pre- and post-LPR, suggests that the two groups of formerly unauthorized workers stand to gain 
substantially more from earning green cards than do their always-legal counterparts – their 
earnings rise by an average of $3,100 (illegal border crossers) and $3,700 (visa abusers), 
compared to $1,700 for the continuously legal group. 
Immigrants in our three legal groups differ in many dimensions of observable characteristics. 
For example, Table 1 shows that illegal border crossers are less likely to be female, less likely to 
be married, and have more children than do their counterparts. Close to 90 percent of illegal 
border crossers come from Latin America and the Caribbean, with slightly more than 38 percent 9 
 
from Mexico. In the legal sub-group, Asian immigrants constitute nearly 40 percent, while only 
three percent are Mexican. The class of admission used to gain LPR status also varies greatly 
across the three groups. While family preferences are the most common way of receiving legal 
permanent resident status for each group, employment preferences are much more commonly 
used by continuously legal immigrants (21.0 percent) than by visa abusers (11.4 percent) or 
illegal border crossers (3.6 percent). A similar, if less pronounced, pattern emerges in the use of 
the diversity lottery.  Illegal border crossers are the most likely group to employ the 
“legalization” option – 37.3% obtained LPR status this way. This not a program, but rather a 
collection of special legislation and other instances in which illegal residents qualified to have 
their deportation orders canceled. The legalization category includes those who qualified for the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997. 
The illegal border crossers group displays low levels of education, as reflected in the mean 
total years of education (9.5 years) and the profile of educational attainment – 61.7 percent do 
not have a high school diploma, compared with 22.9 and 20.8 percent of visa abusers and 
continuously legal immigrants, respectively. Similarly, only 7.2 percent of illegal border crossers 
have a bachelor’s degree, while more than a third of the visa abusers and nearly half of strictly 
legal respondents do. English ability also varies across the three groups with visa abusers 
appearing to be the most fluent group.  Forty-five percent of illegal border crossers report that 
they speak and understand English either “not well” or “not at all,” compared with only about a 
third of each of the other groups, and only 14.4 percent report top levels of speaking and 
comprehension, as compared with roughly a third for visa abusers and continuously legal 
respondents. We also observe differences in the time elapsed between the beginning of that pre-
LPR occupation and the eventual NIS interview – illegal border crossers had been in the U.S. for 
an average of 11.0 years since taking that job, compared with 5.9 years and 2.7 years, 
respectively, for the visa abusers and the strictly legal immigrants.  
To better understand occupational mobility, we examine occupations by legal status group. 
Table 2 displays for each group the top ten pre-LPR occupations and their representation. The 
second column shows what percentage of these job-holders stayed in the same occupation in 
their post-LPR job. The last column shows each of the top ten pre-LPR period job’s 
representation in the post-LPR era. A few patterns emerge. 10 
 
First, the jobs most commonly held by former illegal border crossers tend to be in low-skill 
occupations. Many of these occupations appear as well among the jobs reported by former visa 
overstayers, the new additions being retail salespersons, waiters and waitresses, and nursing, 
psychiatric, and home health aides. Some of the same jobs appear near the top of the list for 
continuously legal workers as well, but now the additions are in more conspicuously high-skill 
occupations: computer software engineers and postsecondary teachers.  
Almost without exception, the most commonly held occupation in the post-LPR job is the 
one held in the pre-LPR job. (The two exceptions are dishwashers, who predominantly took 
other jobs in the food service industry, and child care workers, who were only slightly more 
likely to take jobs as maids and housekeeping cleaners than to stay in their previous occupation.) 
Third, the two groups of formerly unauthorized workers show a greater propensity towards 
occupational mobility than does the group of consistently legal workers.  In just this sample of 
the ten most common occupations for each group, the former illegal border crossers stayed in 
their pre-LPR occupations about 26 percent of the time. The former visa abusers maintained their 
pre-LPR occupations 36 percent of the time. But the consistently legal immigrants stayed in their 
pre-LPR occupations 62 percent of the time.  This may be largely a result of the aforementioned 
differences in recent U.S. experience – both formerly illegal groups report much more time spent 
here since beginning the pre-LPR job than do the consistently legal immigrants.  
 
5.  Empirical Model 
 
Our empirical strategy is to compare employment outcomes of unauthorized workers to 
immigrants with no unauthorized immigration history. Clearly we need to address the 
endogeneity, or selection, concerns stemming from the possibility that individuals sort 
themselves into the three groups partially based on factors related to employment outcomes. It 
should be pointed out that we do not view the comparison of outcomes across groups as a quasi-
experimental exercise since the distinction across groups is arguably due to unobservable 
personal decisions and characteristics which may also be linked to earnings. Our approach is to 
as carefully as possible control for these factors in our empirical models by including variables 
that serve as proxies.  11 
 
Immigrants can obtain LPR status through different classes of admission. The most 
common pathway is through family already present in the U.S. Close to 2/3 of immigrants who 
received a green card in our sample used these close family relations to obtain LPR status. The 
next most common pathways are through refugee/asylum status (11.5 percent) and employment 
preferences (11.4 percent).  
Although it is well known that immigrants in different class of admission groups differ in 
observable skills, they may also differ with respect to unobservable earnings related factors. For 
example, it may be that immigrants obtaining LPR status through employment preferences 
possess more of these characteristics, say motivation, ambition or ability, than immigrants who 
receive a green card through family. It is also possible that immigrants receiving a green card 
through family preferences benefit from existing family networks to a greater extent than other 
immigrants. Controlling for eventual class of LPR admission may then serve to address the role 
of unobservable earnings related characteristics. In addition, the inclusion of country of origin 
fixed effects will further control for such factors, which are unobserved by the econometrician. 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following regression model of pre-
LPR status log-annual earnings and log-hourly wages, , of individual i from country j who 
arrived at time t. 
 
Pre-LPR Pre-LPR
12 ijt i i it i j t ijt yI B C O S e αα β γ δ τ =+ + + + + + XW      ( 1 )  
 
Where IBC and OS are indicator variables for border crossers and overstayers and; 
=  Matrix containing demographic characteristics such as age, gender, family 
composition, educational attainment and geographic location 
i W         =  Matrix containing network proxies represented by class of admission and whether 
post-LPR job was obtained with the help of family or relative and whether the 
person works for a relative. 
         = Country of origin fixed effects 
         = Year of entry fixed effects 
An analysis of labor market outcomes at first U.S. job potentially provides information 
on the penalty of lacking legal status. A concern with interpreting this as a legalization effect in a 








status. Instead, we view this as a starting point, arguing that if the lack of legal status is a barrier 
to good employment outcomes, removing this barrier should lead to better outcomes for this 
group, holding other individual factors constant, and comparing those changes to those of 
continuously legal. 
To do so, we specify a model of the changes in outcomes between the pre- and post-LPR 
periods. The specification contains the above factors as well as information on post-LPR English 
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The parameters of interest in specifications (1) and (2) are  , , , and  . Under the 
assumptions that   and 
Pre-LPR [| , , ] 0 it it i t EeO S δτ = X , i.e., conditional 
on  , the disturbance term is uncorrelated with legal status, OLS will yield 
unbiased estimates of the employment effect of legalization. Similar assumptions are necessary 
for OLS estimates of   and   to be unbiased, although these are arguably more tenable given 
the focus on changes. A limitation to our OLS approach is that there is no formal test for whether 
these assumptions hold. Unfortunately, we are not aware of an appropriate instrument for legal 
status in the pre-LPR period in our data. Nonetheless, we believe that the above factors, which 
also include potentially important controls for unobservable factors like networks, time-of-arrival 
macro economic conditions, assimilation and  transferability of human capital, substantially 
reduce the concerns of endogeneity of legal status.  
Also if, among our NIS sample, the above factors fail to capture employment related 
unobservable factors correlated with legal status (such as ability, motivation and networks), these 
factors are likely to be positively correlated with authorized status, exacerbating the differences 
between legal and illegal workers and hence leading to an upward bias of the OLS estimated 
legalization benefits. From this perspective, the presented results below are upper bounds of the 
employment gains to adjusting to legal status. 
However, it is also possible that our NIS sample is not representative of the general 
unauthorized population in the country. It seems plausible that the unauthorized immigrants who 
Post-LPR
it X
1 α 2 α 1 α′ 2 α′
Pre-LPR [| , , ] 0 it it i t EeI B C δτ = X
Pre-LPR, a n d   it i t δ τ X
1 α′ 2 α′13 
 
find a way to obtain a green card are positively selected, compared to those who do not. If 
lacking legal status can be overcome more easily among the positively selected unauthorized 
immigrants in the NIS data by using, for example, their network of friends and family, our 
estimates understate what the true employment gains to legalization are. That is, our results 
cannot be expected to be the same for the general population of unauthorized immigrants 
residing in the United States unless the two groups are similar and operate in similar labor 
markets. 
Comparing the same sample of unauthorized in the NIS as the one used in this paper to 
Passel’s (2009) CPS estimates of the characteristics of the unauthorized working age population 
in general, Hill, Lofstrom and Hayes (2010) show that the distributions of educational attainment 
and occupations are very similar across samples. One noticeable difference is that the NIS 
sample is slightly older and has been in the U.S. longer than the overall population of 
unauthorized immigrants. This is not surprising but is also of policy relevant since, like with 
IRCA, a new amnesty is very likely to include a length of residency requirement, meaning that 
the most recent arrivals will not qualify for receiving legal status. Overall, a comparison of 
observable factors fail to reveal evidence that the NIS sample is substantially different from the 
population of unauthorized immigrants who are most likely to qualify for any future amnesty. 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
 
Occupational Earnings and Mobility 
We begin our discussion of the empirical results with an analysis of pre-LPR median earnings by 
occupation. Before doing so, a reminder on our terminology is warranted. For simplicity, we will 
frequently refer to our foreign born gender-specific median annual earnings by occupations simply as 
“occupational earnings”, particularly in the pre-LPR analysis. 
Pre-LPR Status Occupational Earnings Differences 
Unauthorized workers are employed in occupations with substantially lower earnings than 
are legal workers. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the pre-LPR period unadjusted occupational 
earnings differences between crossers and individuals authorized to work are approximately 31 14 
 
and 28 percent respectively for men and women.
1 The unadjusted unauthorized occupational 
earnings penalty for overstayers is substantially smaller, 13 percent for men and 10 percent for 
women.  
The observed pre-LPR occupational earnings differences may not be related to legal status 
but may instead be a consequence of differences in earnings-related factors. We next investigate 
how much of the unauthorized occupational earnings gaps are due to differences in demographic 
characteristics. The Model 2 results indicate that roughly between ¼ and ½ of the lower 
occupational earnings among unauthorized workers are due to differences in factors such as age, 
family composition, geographic location and years of schooling. A closer look reveals that 
among these factors education differences drive the results. In fact, we obtain adjusted gaps of 
the same magnitudes as those reported for Model 2 using a model specification where we only 
add years of schooling to the Model 1 specification.
2  
We find that differences in year of arrival are somewhat important factors contributing to the 
observed pre-LPR unauthorized occupational earnings differences (Model 3). Furthermore, 
differences in the country of origin composition across the three legal status groups help explain 
the lower occupational earnings among unauthorized immigrants. The Model 4 specification 
results show that roughly three to five percentage points of the lower earnings of unauthorized 
immigrants can be attributed to differences in the country of origin composition. 
We next investigate whether differences in class of admission or use of family-specific 
networks matters.  Results are presented as Model specification 5. We find that these variables 
help explain the pre-LPR occupational earnings gap somewhat beyond the ones already taken 
into account. Comparing observationally similar crossers to continuously legal immigrants, we 
estimate that the pre-legalization earnings penalty, based on median occupational earnings, of 
being a crosser is about 12 percent for men and 8 percent for women. For male overstayers the 
penalty is approximately 10 percent and even less for women, about 7 percent.  
The finding that unauthorized immigrants work in occupations with lower median annual 
earnings than observationally similar legal workers in the pre-LPR period is consistent with 
unauthorized status limiting their labor market opportunities. As discussed above, these 
differences may be due to other factors than legal status and a more reliable approach to estimate 
                                                 
1 We use e
b-1, where b is the estimated coefficient, to convert the log point estimates into percentages. 
2 The results are not presented in the table but are available upon request. 15 
 
the legalization effect is to see whether legal status opens the doors to occupations that allow 
previously unauthorized immigrants to find jobs that are better aligned with their skills, and 
hence better paid.  Consequently, we next address the issue whether obtaining legal status leads 
to greater upward occupational mobility, as measured by occupational earnings, and whether 
legalization allows pre-LPR status unauthorized workers to catch up with their continuously 
legal counterparts. 
Occupational Mobility - Pre-Post Changes in Occupational Earnings 
Between the pre- and post-LPR periods, the annual occupational earnings of male 
immigrants who were unauthorized to work in the pre-LPR period increased by roughly 13 
percent more than did the occupational earnings of continuously legal immigrants, Table 4. The 
unadjusted differences are roughly the same for males who crossed the border illegally or 
violated the terms of a visa. The occupational earnings growth differences among women are 
smaller. Female overstayers’ and crossers’ occupational earnings grew by about six and four 
percent respectively more than the earnings of continuously legal women. These unadjusted 
occupational earnings growth differences are shown as Model 1 in Table 4. We next turn to an 
analysis of whether, and to what extent, these differences are due to factors other than 
legalization. 
The estimates using Model specification 2 in Table 4 indicate that differences in the 
demographic composition between the three legalization groups are not major factors explaining 
the relatively higher earnings growth among pre-LPR unauthorized workers. However, the 
Model 3 results show that the observed greater increase in earnings among immigrants who were 
not authorized to work in the pre-LPR period, compared to immigrants who were authorized, is 
to a large extent due to the fact that they have been in the U.S. for a longer time.
3 This appears to 
be particularly relevant to crossers for whom we do not find any greater increase in occupational 
earnings once this factor is accounted for. In fact, the subsequent addition of controls for country 
of origin, class of admission or family network differences across groups do not change the 
estimated occupational earnings growth differences greatly compared to the ones shown for 
Model 3. 
                                                 
3 Note that given that all post-LPR status interviews took place within a few months, the arrival year fixed effects 
captures assimilation, or put differently, years in the U.S. effects on earnings. They also capture potential long 
lasting effects of the macro economic conditions present at the time of arrival in the U.S. 16 
 
The results indicate that overstayers benefited significantly from obtaining LPR status. 
Although they worked in occupations with lower earnings in the pre-LPR status period than their 
otherwise observationally similar legal immigrant counterparts, they work in equally well paid 
occupations after receiving their green cards.
4 This holds for both men and women and suggests 
that legalization opened the door to labor market opportunities they could not access without 
authorization to work. Crossers, on the other hand, are not as fortunate and do not improve their 
occupational earnings appreciably after receiving LPR status. We fail to find evidence that the 
earnings of immigrant men or women in this legal status group increase at all in response to 
obtaining green cards, relative to those of their observationally similar continuously legal 
counterparts. 
Our empirical results point towards years in the U.S. as a major determinant in explaining 
occupational earnings growth differences between unauthorized workers and continuously legal 
immigrants. However, as Table 2 indicates, few of the workers in the latter group have been in 
the U.S. for a very long time, the average years since first U.S. job is less than 3 years, compared 
to 11 years for illegal border crossers.  This is not surprising since temporary work visas, such as 
H-1B, are issued for three years (renewable once for a total of six years). Given the limitations of 
how long continuously legal workers can work legally in the U.S. without adjusting their status 
to LPR, we estimated the occupational earnings models for the sub-sample of immigrants who 
have spent no more than five years since their first U.S. job. The results, shown in Appendix 
Table A1, are similar to the ones we obtain with our larger unrestricted samples of immigrants. 
The magnitudes of the legal status parameters are somewhat smaller, and not surprisingly less 
precisely estimated, and imply that receiving legal status leads to greater upward occupational 
mobility only for visa overstayers. 
 
Exploring the Role of Skills 
Why do overstayers benefit from legalization while crossers do not? A look at Table 1 
reveals that these two groups differ in terms of skills. Over 60 percent of crossers have less than 
a high school diploma, while the same is true for a much smaller share of overstayers, 23 
percent. Also, over 30 percent of overstayers report excellent English ability, while only 14 
                                                 
4 We fail to reject the hypotheses of equal earnings between observationally similar overstayers and continuously 
legal immigrants in post-LPR status earnings regression model, results not shown but available upon request.  17 
 
percent of crossers do. It is possible that for the relatively more highly skilled group, overstayers, 
lack of legal status might suppress earnings opportunities, whereas for the less skilled it does not.  
One approach to test whether relatively higher-skilled unauthorized immigrants are more 
constrained by their legal status than their less-skilled counterparts is to look for differences in 
the impact of receiving a green card for unauthorized workers by educational attainment. To do 
so, we defined indicator variables for schooling level (less than high school, high school 
graduate, some college or college graduate) and interacted these variables with legal status. The 
pre-post occupational mobility results, presented in Table 5, quite clearly show that upward 
mobility as a result of receiving legal status is limited to unauthorized workers with at least some 
college education. The estimates indicate that unauthorized workers, both overstayers and 
crossers, who arrived in the U.S. with no more than a high school degree, experienced no greater 
occupational mobility than observationally similar legal workers. These results suggest that the 
finding that overstayers benefitted from receiving legal status while crossers did not is driven by 
the relatively higher levels of skill and education among overstayers. 
Many unauthorized immigrants are low-skilled and work in low-skilled jobs, as can be seen 
in Table 2. It is of course possible that it is the lack of legal rights to work in the U.S. that 
constrains these workers to low-skilled occupations. Table 2 also reveals that a higher proportion 
of unauthorized workers leave their pre-LPR occupation than continuously legal immigrants. An 
alternative way to determine the labor market benefits of receiving LPR status is to restrict the 
analysis to immigrants who were observed in low-skilled occupations in the pre-LPR period.   
We hypothesize that if unauthorized status limits some workers to these low-skilled 
occupations, we would expect to see a higher proportion of unauthorized immigrants moving to 
occupations with higher earnings once they receive LPR status. To test this, we analyze 
occupational mobility of a subset of our occupational earnings sample restricted to immigrants 
who reported working in specific low-skilled occupations in the period before receiving legal 
status. The subset is limited to occupations for which we have representation from all three legal 
status groups, wherein the typical worker has less than a high school degree, and that are among 
the most common low-skilled occupations for unauthorized workers. These restrictions yield the 
following low-skilled occupations; maids and housekeeping cleaners, janitors and building 
cleaners, cooks, dishwashers, construction workers, child care workers and agricultural workers. 
The low-skill occupation sample represents approximately 20 percent of our full occupational 18 
 
earnings sample and consists of 37 percent continuously legal immigrants, 22 percent 
overstayers and 41 percent crossers. 
The results limited to the sub-sample of immigrants working in low-skilled occupations in 
the pre-LPR period, shown in Table 6, show that previously unauthorized immigrants moved up 
to more remunerative occupations than did continuously legal immigrants (Model 1). However, 
once we control for our full set of observable characteristics, Model 5, we find no evidence that 
unauthorized immigrants moved to more high paying occupations than did continuously legal 
immigrants. The results fail to reveal any differences across the three legal status groups in 
occupational earnings in the post-LPR period.  
These results suggest that the relatively skilled unauthorized workers for whom we found 
benefitting from receiving a green card were not limited to these common low-skilled 
occupations in the pre-LPR period – if these existed in any meaningful numbers, we would 
expect to see higher earnings among the unauthorized immigrants in the post-LPR period – we 
do not. Also, the results imply that the greater occupational mobility that we observe in Table 2 
among unauthorized immigrants in low-skilled occupations is mostly not associated with moves 
to higher paying occupations.   
So far we have relied on an outcome measure using gender-specific median annual earnings 
among immigrants. We next turn to an analysis in which we rely on individuals’ reported hourly 
wages. 
 
Results Using Self-Reported Wages 
As with our occupational median earnings measure, we observe substantially lower 
wages among unauthorized workers, as compared to continuously legal workers. Model 1 in 
Table 7 shows that the pre-LPR period unadjusted wage differences between crossers and 
individuals authorized to work are approximately 42 and 41 percent respectively for men and 
women. The unadjusted unauthorized earnings penalty for overstayers is substantially smaller, 
12 percent for men and 10 percent for women.  
The wage differences are likely to be at least partially due to some of the differences in 
demographic characteristics such as family composition, education and geographic location, 
shown in Table 1. The results in Model 2 show that these factors explain much of the lower 
earnings among unauthorized workers. In fact, these factors alone explain the lower wages 19 
 
among overstayers, relative to continuously legal workers.
5 Furthermore, once we add country of 
origin and year of arrival fixed effects, we fail to find a pre-LPR earnings penalty among 
crossers.  
We next explore whether receiving legal status allowed for greater wage growth among 
unauthorized workers. Given that we do not find a pre-LPR wage penalty for unauthorized 
workers, we do not expect to find higher wage growth among the unauthorized once our set of 
control variables is taken into account. Nonetheless, we examine the possibility of such 
differences by estimating regressions of pre-post-LPR changes in hourly wages and present the 
results in Table 8. Hourly wages increased substantially more between the pre- and post-LPR 
periods among unauthorized workers compared to continuously legal workers. However, as with 
our occupational mobility analysis, the greater growth is mostly due to demographic factors and 
the greater time spent in the U.S. by previously unauthorized workers. 
Above, we tested the hypothesis that if unauthorized workers are restricted to low-skilled 
occupations in their first job in the U.S. we would expect that they are more likely to move to 
better paid occupations after receiving a green card than observationally similar continuously 
legal immigrants in the same pre-LPR low-skilled occupations. Although we found no support 
for this notion, it is possible that there was greater upward mobility within occupations among 
the previously unauthorized workers. That is, some of these workers may not change their 
occupation but upon receiving a green card they obtain better paid position in the same 
occupation (for example, going from a non-unionized to unionized janitorial job). Our 
occupational earnings analysis would fail to reveal such a pattern. To address this concern, we 
re-estimate the models in Table 6 using instead of the post-LPR occupational annual earnings the 
reported post-LPR wages. Utilizing this outcome measure addresses the concern of within 
occupational improvements in remuneration. The results from this sensitivity analysis are shown 
in Appendix Table A2 and also provide no evidence of higher post-LPR wages among the 
previously unauthorized low-skilled occupation workers compared to their observationally 
similar continuously legal counterparts. 
Our estimates may underestimate the impact of legal status if continuously legal immigrants 
benefit from adjusting to permanent legal status (for example, for H-1B holders the adjustment 
                                                 
5 Controlling only for years of schooling reduces the earnings gap between continuously legal workers and crossers 
by half, relative to the unadjusted differences. 20 
 
removes the attachment to a particular employer). To address this concern, we looked at pre- to 
post-LPR wage gains among the continuously legal sample. Although the unadjusted gains to 
adjustment to LPR status are positive and significant (27 percent) once we account for 
potentially relevant factors such as the number of years between the first job and the post-LPR 
job, we find no statistically significant effect of adjusting to legal status for the continuously 
legal sample.
6 The results suggest that the unadjusted wage gains are primarily due to labor 
market assimilation and not due to change in status. 
Overall, the results using hourly wages are consistent with our median occupational earnings 
measures. A noteworthy difference is that these results more strongly indicate that the labor 
market benefits, as measured by hourly wages, to gaining legal status are very limited and 
possibly zero. In our occupational mobility analysis we found some evidence that overstayers 
benefitted from gaining legal status. There is a concern that the lack of a wage effect even among 
these previously unauthorized workers may be due to the smaller, more restrictive sub-sample 
for which we have valid wage information. To address this concern we re-estimated key model 
specification using the median annual occupational earnings measure limited to the smaller wage 
sample. The results, presented in Appendix Table A3, are very similar to the full occupation 
sample results and do not reveal any meaningful sensitivity of the specific sample used. 
Although we are not able to determine the reason for the differences in pre-LPR results between 
occupational based earnings and hourly wages, we note that it may be due to recall bias. The pre-
LPR period for unauthorized workers was several years earlier on average than it was among 
continuously legal immigrants. It is possible that because of this, they recall pre-LPR wages with 
greater error than legal immigrants do. 
As discussed above, there is a concern that individuals do not accurately recall wages from 
the first job held in the U.S. as for many this was more than five years ago. However, we believe 
that the reported occupation of their first job in the U.S. and current wages at the time of the 
interview closely reflect their actual labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the main conclusions 
that the there are no labor market benefits of obtaining legal status for most unauthorized 
immigrant workers, do not depend on the outcome measure used. Overall, the broad sensitivity 
analyses we provide suggest that our results are robust to the employment measure used. 
                                                 
6 The estimated adjusted wage change is about -4 percent with a t-statistic of -0.88. The results are not shown in the 
tables but available upon request from the authors. 21 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Nearly 12 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States (Passel and Cohn, 
2009). Currently, legislators in Washington, D.C., are considering comprehensive reform in 
federal immigration policies, including legalizing unauthorized immigrants. Many observers, 
supported by the findings of the 1986 IRCA based research, believe that the economic effects of 
a legalization program could be substantial, significantly improving employment outcomes 
among the workers restricted in their opportunities due to lack of legal status (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 
2010).  
In this paper we use recent data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) to assess whether a 
new legalization program is likely to lead to upward occupational mobility or wage gains. 
Importantly, the rich NIS data allow us to identify immigrant workers who were unauthorized to 
work prior to obtaining LPR status and to distinguish between different types of illegal 
immigration experience – those who crossed the border without proper documentation and those 
who violated the terms of their visa. We use the group of continuously legal immigrants as a 
comparison group in our empirical approach. 
We find that legalizing unauthorized immigrants is unlikely to lead to dramatic changes in 
the labor market outcomes of most unauthorized immigrants. This is especially true for low-
skilled workers, for whom any improvement is likely to be small at best. For immigrants who 
cross the border without documentation, employment outcomes do improve over time—but none 
of these improvements are attributable to gaining legal status. For those who gain legalization 
after overstaying a temporary visa, the outlook is slightly better. In these cases, we do see some 
upward occupational mobility, which may be related to acquiring legal status. However, this 
finding is specifically attributable to skill level: We find that highly skilled immigrants, 
regardless of how they arrived in the United States, exhibit occupational improvements after 
gaining legal status.    
These findings differ from the influential research based on IRCA, which consistently found 
evidence of employment gains (e.g. Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002 and 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Rafael, 2007). This research was limited to Mexican and Central 
American immigrants and did not separately identify effects for crossers and overstayers. 
However, we do not believe that the differences are driven by these factors since the only 22 
 
noticeable gains found in our study are, regardless of illegal status group, among the relatively 
few most educated unauthorized immigrants (a small number of whom originate in Mexico or 
Central America).
7 What are then the most likely reasons for the discrepancy? 
One noticeable difference between our study and the IRCA research is that we only observe 
outcomes among the previously unauthorized immigrants during the first year after adjusting 
status while the LPS collects the information about four years after becoming legal. It is 
plausible that one year is not enough time for the employment legalization benefits to 
materialize. If unauthorized immigrants are receiving below market wages for legal workers, it is 
reasonable to expect that they would also be more likely to search for new employment than 
continuously legal immigrants after obtaining LPR status. However, Hill, Lofstrom and Hayes 
(2010) find no evidence supporting this. They also find no support for greater investments in 
human capital among the previously unauthorized, which would lead to future improvements in 
labor market outcomes. Lastly, the period between receiving legal status and the NIS interview 
was sufficiently long for us to detect gains among high-skilled previously unauthorized 
immigrants, for whom we would expect that it would take longer time to find new suitable 
employment than low-skilled workers. This is not conclusive but suggests that the differences 
may not be due to short-run versus medium-run. 
Our findings of small or no gains are however consistent with recent research relying on 
more recent data. For example, Pan (2010) and Barcellos (2010) provide evidence that the 
positive wage effects among workers who obtained legal status through IRCA dissipated over 
time and are no longer noticeable. It appears that the labor market for low-skilled unauthorized 
immigrants may have changed and that employer sanctions may have lost their bite. 
Immediately following IRCA’s implementation, employers of all types were probably 
concerned about the employer sanctions that were part of the legislation. In the current era, it 
seems likely that employment law violations are more likely anticipated among the employers of 
the highly skilled than among those employing low-skilled workers. This should then impact the 
wages and occupational opportunities for the high-skill and low-skilled unauthorized workers 
differently.   
                                                 
7 Recent studies estimate that the group with a bachelor’s degree or more comprise a relatively small share of the 
unauthorized immigrant population, about 15 percent in 2008 (Passel and Cohn 2009).   23 
 
Employers of low-skilled workers probably correctly assess the very low probability that 
they will be caught or fined for having hired unauthorized workers. Thus, the relatively 
ineffective employer sanctions mean that they do not differentiate pay to low-skilled laborers 
based on legal status. In the period immediately following IRCA, employers likely did expect 
that the newly approved employer sanctions for hiring unauthorized workers would have teeth. 
That does not appear to be the case now. Indeed, because we find that there are no real 
differences in occupational mobility or reported wages among low-skilled unauthorized 
immigrants, when compared to continuously legal immigrants it appears that labor markets 
function competitively for low-skilled unauthorized workers.   
The labor market for high-skilled workers may on the other hand be monopsonistic, with 
fewer and larger employers than the low-skilled labor market. The cost of detection and fines 
(including reputational cost) and of losing a trained employee because of employment law 
violations might be too great for high-skill employer, and they might avoid hiring unauthorized 
workers in the first place. After a high-skilled unauthorized immigrant gains legal status, he or 
she could successfully apply for jobs that were formerly closed off.  Because we separate high-
skill workers from low-skill workers, we may be in a position to observe an effect of employer 
sanctions on the occupational mobility and reported wages of unauthorized high-skill workers 
after they become legal. 
Lastly but importantly, the results in this paper have strong policy relevance. Comprehensive 
immigration reform will need to include a newly effective employment verification system, 
possibly mandating the use of the federal government’s E-Verify program for all new hires, as 
well as sanctions for employers with teeth in order for the reform to act as a deterrent to future 
unauthorized immigration. 
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Pre‐LPR Job  $15,160  $19,727  $23,913 
Post‐LPR Job  $18,272  $23,418  $25,613 
Change  $3,112  $3,692  $1,700 
      
Demographic traits          
Share of Sample  25.9  27.6  46.4 
Percent Female  36.8  45.8  44.4 
Percent Married  67.8  80.7  75.5 
Mean Number of Children  2.3  1.6  1.2 
Mean age at NIS interview  35.8  37.1  35.0 
Mean age first worked during last U.S. trip  24.8  31.2  32.3 
Mean duration of pre‐LPR job (years)  3.8  2.5  1.4 
Mean time elapsed since start of pre‐LPR job (years)  11.0  5.9  2.7 
      
Country of Origin      
Mexico  38.5  16.4  3.0 
Other Latin America & the Caribbean  50.1  29.0  18.5 
East Asia, South Asia & the Pacific  4.5  18.0  38.8 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  0.8  8.3  8.2 
Europe & Central Asia  2.5  18.7  22.1 
Middle East & North Africa  1.0  5.4  5.0 
All Other  2.6  4.1  4.4 
      
Class of admission      
Spouse of Citizen  33.1  53.0  30.4 
Child of Citizen (<21, unmarried)  1.6  1.7  1.9 
Parent of Citizen  2.5  4.3  1.9 
Child of Citizen (21+ and/or married)  1.7  1.4  0.9 
Spouse of LPR  3.3  0.8  0.9 
Sibling of Citizen  0.9  2.1  7.3 
Employment Preference  3.6  11.4  21.0 
Diversity Lottery  0.7  4.8  14.3 
Refugee/Asylee  8.2  11.5  8.6 
Legalization  37.3  3.6  0.5 
Other  7.1  5.5  12.3 
      27 
 
Helped by a Relative to Get Current Job  18.3  11.1  18.7 
Current Employer is a Relative  2.3  3.2  3.9 
      
Human Capital      
Total number of years of education  9.5  13.7  14.3 
Total number of U.S. years of education  1.3  1.0  0.9 
Proportion with less than high school diploma  61.7  22.9  20.8 
Proportion with a high school diploma  22.6  28.7  21.1 
Proportion with some college  8.6  12.9  10.2 
Proportion with a bachelor’s degree or more   7.2  35.4  48.0 
      
Proportion with excellent English  14.4  31.1  28.8 
Proportion with very good English  7.9  8.8  7.7 
Proportion with good English  32.8  29.0  26.8 
      
Number of Observations  945 1,071 2,470














































1  Maids And Housekeeping Cleaners  7.4  42.3  7.2    
2  Other Agricultural Workers       7.3  28.1  2.7    
3  Janitors And Building Cleaners   6.0  24.5  5.5    
4  Dishwashers                      5.2  0.0  0.5    
5  Child Care Workers               5.1  13.3  1.6    
6  Cooks                            4.4  28.2  5.0    
7  Construction Laborers            4.1  31.9  3.0    
8  Cashiers                         3.7  22.2  2.7    
9  Grounds Maintenance Workers      3.5  36.5  2.4    
10  Sewing Machine Operator          2.5  27.0  1.0    














1  Cashiers                                     5.9  23.9  2.7    
2  Maids And Housekeeping Cleaners              4.4  44.4  3.4    
3  Janitors And Building Cleaners               3.7  26.1  2.2    
4  Cooks                                        3.4  52.7  3.1    
5  Retail Salespersons                          3.3  36.9  3.6    
6  Waiters And Waitresses                       3.3  33.3  2.6    
7  Child Care Workers                           3.0  44.3  2.2    
8  Construction Laborers                        2.3  28.1  1.7    
9  Nursing, Psychiatric, And Home Health Aides  2.0  57.1  3.0    
10  Grounds Maintenance Workers                  2.0  13.9  0.3    














1  Cashiers                                     5.9  65.4  5.0    
2  Computer Software Engineers                  3.9  72.8  4.3    
3  Waiters And Waitresses                       3.4  51.0  2.1    
4  Maids And Housekeeping Cleaners              3.4  77.5  2.9    
5  Janitors And Building Cleaners               3.3  60.3  3.6    
6  Postsecondary Teachers                       3.0  37.0  1.7    
7  Nursing, Psychiatric, And Home Health Aides  2.5  60.6  2.8    
8  Retail Salespersons                          2.4  62.1  2.5    
9  Registered Nurses                            2.4  79.9  2.4    
10  Stock Clerks And Order Fillers               2.3  52.3  1.7    
  Sum/Totals  32.6  62.4  29.1    
Source: 2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS) 
 29 
 
Table 3.  
OLS Regression Results, Log of Occupational Annual Earnings, Pre-LPR Status Period. 
Model Specification 
1  2  3  4  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR Job ‐ 0.134 ‐ 0.108 ‐ 0.181 ‐ 0.138 ‐ 0.107 
  (2.48)  (2.41)  (3.93)  (3.81)  (3.10) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR Job ‐ 0.370 ‐ 0.173 ‐ 0.219 ‐ 0.175 ‐ 0.122 
  (4.47)  (3.36)  (4.35)  (4.48)  (3.43) 
Female*Overstayer  0.024  0.026  0.029  0.046  0.035 
  (0.43)  (0.52)  (0.60)  (1.04)  (0.88) 
Female*Crosser  0.048  0.049  0.038  0.050  0.038 
  (0.62)  (0.77)  (0.60)  (0.84)  (0.70) 
Female ‐ 0.410 ‐ 0.261 ‐ 0.300 ‐ 0.330 ‐ 0.339 
  (5.13)  (3.92)  (4.47)  (5.23)  (5.54) 
Age   0.019  0.022  0.022  0.018 
   (3.55)  (4.04)  (3.89)  (3.85) 
Age²/100   ‐ 0.029 ‐ 0.029 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.026 
   (3.84)  (3.68)  (4.00)  (4.14) 
Married   0.148  0.109  0.064  0.033 
   (3.43)  (3.15)  (2.30)  (1.09) 
Number of Children   ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.012 ‐ 0.011 ‐ 0.010 
   (0.60)  (1.06)  (0.96)  (0.96) 
Female*Married   ‐ 0.117 ‐ 0.087 ‐ 0.081 ‐ 0.044 
   (1.89)  (1.40)  (1.49)  (1.02) 
Married*Number of Children   ‐ 0.017 ‐ 0.012 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.002 
   (1.28)  (0.93)  (0.43)  (0.17) 
Female*Number of Children   ‐ 0.014 ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.014 ‐ 0.008 
   ‐ 1.040 ‐ 1.410 ‐ 1.100 ‐ 0.700 
Female*Married*Number of Children   0.017  0.018  0.015  0.009 
   (0.89)  (0.91)  (0.81)  (0.53) 
Years of Education before Migration   0.034  0.030  0.023  0.018 
   (5.32)  (6.05)  (5.88)  (5.10) 
Female*Years of Ed before Migration   ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.003 
   (0.66)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.57) 
Class of Admission:       




Adult Child of U.S. citizen       ‐ 0.082 
       (1.29) 
Spouse of LPR       ‐ 0.035 
       (0.60) 




Diversity Lottery       ‐ 0.153 
       (4.39) 
Refugee/Asylee/Parolee       ‐ 0.133 30 
 
Model Specification 
1  2  3  4  5 
       (2.88) 
Legalization       ‐ 0.065 
       (1.68) 
Other       ‐ 0.067 
       (1.94) 
Helped by a Relative to Get Current Job       ‐ 0.037 
        (1.95) 
Current Employer is a Relative        0.068 
        (1.08) 
Includes Fixed Effects:        
State  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
          
R‐Squared  0.189  0.291  0.344  0.399  0.461 
Number of Observations  4,486 
Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 
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Table 4.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Occupational Annual Earnings, Post-Pre LPR Status 
Periods 
   Model Specification 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job  0.125  0.113  0.068  0.072  0.064 
  (5.52)  (5.14)  (3.05)  (3.18)  (2.85) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job  0.132  0.120 ‐ 0.008 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.017 
  (4.47)  (4.04)  (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.49) 
Female*Overstayer ‐ 0.069 ‐ 0.058 ‐ 0.051 ‐ 0.056 ‐ 0.056 
  (2.03)  (1.77)  (1.60)  (1.78)  (1.77) 
Female*Crosser ‐ 0.096 ‐ 0.073 ‐ 0.056 ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.055 
  (2.29)  (1.82)  (1.33)  (1.38)  (1.28) 
Female  0.019  0.048  0.042  0.048  0.052 
  (0.82)  (0.86)  (0.76)  (0.85)  (0.92) 
Age   0.012 ‐ 0.003 ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.003 
   (2.39)  (0.70)  (0.79)  (0.61) 
Age²/100   ‐ 0.015  0.001  0.002  0.001 
   (2.45)  (0.12)  (0.30)  (0.17) 
Married   0.015  0.016  0.029  0.013 
   (0.57)  (0.68)  (1.23)  (0.54) 
Number of Children   0.015  0.013  0.011  0.008 
   (1.56)  (1.48)  (1.16)  (0.81) 
Female*Married   ‐ 0.042 ‐ 0.029 ‐ 0.027 ‐ 0.031 
   (1.14)  (0.81)  (0.73)  (0.83) 
Married*Number of Children   ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.001 
   (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.05) 
Female*Number of Children   ‐ 0.010 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.009 
   (0.80)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.75) 
Female*Married*Number of Children   ‐ 0.001  0.003  0.001  0.002 
   (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.09)  (0.12) 
Years of Education before Migration   0.003  0.007  0.008  0.009 
   (1.16)  (2.22)  (2.64)  (2.69) 
Years of Education in the U.S.   0.030  0.025  0.026  0.026 
   (4.21)  (3.77)  (4.17)  (4.22) 
Excellent English   0.004 ‐ 0.034 ‐ 0.046 ‐ 0.046 
   (0.12)  (1.03)  (1.35)  (1.32) 
Very Good English   ‐ 0.014 ‐ 0.024 ‐ 0.027 ‐ 0.025 
   (0.39)  (0.70)  (0.74)  (0.70) 
Good English   0.074  0.047  0.041  0.041 
   (2.91)  (1.82)  (1.65)  (1.65) 
Female*Years of Ed before Migration   0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
   (0.38)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
Female*Years of Ed in the U.S.   0.001 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.002 
   (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.24) 
Female*Excellent English   0.044  0.067  0.074  0.072 
   (0.78)  (1.23)  (1.39)  (1.37) 
Female*Very Good English   0.117  0.107  0.103  0.102 
   (1.80)  (1.78)  (1.68)  (1.70) 
Female*Good English   ‐ 0.073 ‐ 0.049 ‐ 0.042 ‐ 0.045 32 
 
   Model Specification 
   1  2  3  4  5 
   (2.03)  (1.40)  (1.21)  (1.28) 
Duration of Pre‐LPR Job   0.003 ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.007 
   (1.64)  (2.86)  (2.86)  (2.72) 
Interval Between LPR and Interview   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (0.44)  (0.47)  (0.45)  (0.17) 
Class of Admission:        
Minor Child of U.S. citizen        ‐ 0.075 
        (1.65) 
Parent of U.S. citizen        ‐ 0.001 
        (0.03) 
Adult Child of U.S. citizen        0.007 
        (0.12) 
Spouse of LPR        ‐ 0.062 
        (1.70) 
Sibling of U.S. citizen        ‐ 0.017 
        (0.53) 
Employment Preferences        ‐ 0.081 
        (2.12) 
Diversity Lottery        ‐ 0.050 
        (1.74) 
Refugee/Asylee/Parolee        ‐ 0.041 
        (1.08) 
Legalization        ‐ 0.005 
        (0.12) 
Other        ‐ 0.008 
        (0.28) 
Helped by a Relative to Get Current Job        ‐ 0.015 
        (0.85) 
Current Employer is a Relative        ‐ 0.020 
        (0.70) 
Includes Fixed Effects:       
State  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
       
R‐Squared  0.018  0.067  0.119  0.131  0.136 
Number of Observations  4,486 





Table 5.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Occupational Annual Earnings, Post-Pre LPR Status 


























































































































Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 




Table 6.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Occupational Annual Earnings, Pre-to-Post LPR 
Status Periods, and Post-LPR Period; Pre-LPR Low-Skilled Occupation Sub-Sample 
Time Period:  Pre‐ to Post‐LPR  Post‐LPR 
Model Specification:  1  5  1  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job  0.172 ‐ 0.061  0.147 ‐ 0.044 
(3.76)  (1.43)  (2.36)  (0.99) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job  0.223 ‐ 0.015  0.132 ‐ 0.023 
(4.75)  (0.29)  (2.23)  (0.38) 
Female*Overstayer ‐ 0.098  0.009 ‐ 0.104 ‐ 0.020 
(1.25)  (0.15)  (1.19)  (0.35) 
Female*Crosser ‐ 0.151 ‐ 0.094 ‐ 0.105 ‐ 0.087 
(2.33)  (1.88)  (1.48)  (1.62) 
Female  0.012  0.163 ‐ 0.361 ‐ 0.113 



































Female*Good English ‐ 0.023 ‐ 0.034 37 
 
Time Period:  Pre‐ to Post‐LPR  Post‐LPR 
































State  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.060  0.392  0.322  0.568 
Number of Observations  902 
Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 
Model specification number refers to the specifications in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 7.  
OLS Regression Results, Log of Hourly Wages, Pre-LPR Status Period 
   Model Specification 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job ‐ 0.128 ‐ 0.056 ‐ 0.089 ‐ 0.048 ‐ 0.020 
(2.04)  (1.24)  (1.85)  (0.97)  (0.43) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job ‐ 0.543 ‐ 0.196 ‐ 0.115 ‐ 0.063  0.023 
(7.09)  (3.44)  (1.74)  (0.95)  (0.35) 
Female*Overstayer  0.023  0.003  0.021  0.056  0.058 
(0.25)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.77)  (0.82) 
Female*Crosser  0.014 ‐ 0.041 ‐ 0.067 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.039 
(0.13)  (0.47)  (0.78)  (0.06)  (0.46) 
Female ‐ 0.086  0.156  0.085  0.036  0.037 
(1.19)  (1.36)  (0.77)  (0.33)  (0.36) 
Age  0.042  0.039  0.037  0.031 
(4.63)  (4.14)  (3.99)  (3.18) 
Age²/100 ‐ 0.053 ‐ 0.049 ‐ 0.049 ‐ 0.040 
(4.06)  (3.69)  (3.78)  (2.93) 
Married  0.103  0.097  0.060  0.038 
(2.28)  (2.15)  (1.32)  (0.75) 
Number of Children ‐ 0.012  0.005  0.010  0.021 
(0.29)  (0.11)  (0.23)  (0.51) 
Female*Married ‐ 0.076 ‐ 0.083 ‐ 0.082 ‐ 0.028 
(0.98)  (1.10)  (1.12)  (0.39) 
Married*Number of Children ‐ 0.028 ‐ 0.030 ‐ 0.024 ‐ 0.024 
(0.65)  (0.69)  (0.55)  (0.56) 
Female*Number of Children ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.040 ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.030 
‐0.800 ‐ 0.860 ‐ 0.790 ‐ 0.660 
Female*Married*Number of Children  0.034  0.030  0.026  0.013 
(0.68)  (0.61)  (0.52)  (0.28) 
Years of Education before Migration  0.042  0.037  0.028  0.021 
(8.51)  (7.70)  (5.88)  (4.40) 
Female*Years of Ed before Migration ‐ 0.013 ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.008 






























State  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.090  0.202  0.265  0.310  0.373 
Number of Observations  2,660 
Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 
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Table 8.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Hourly Wages, Pre-to-Post LPR Status Periods 
   Model Specification 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job  0.201  0.127 ‐ 0.066 ‐ 0.074 ‐ 0.068 
(3.69)  (2.41)  (1.38)  (1.55)  (1.40) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job  0.521  0.424 ‐ 0.050 ‐ 0.070 ‐ 0.077 
(9.94)  (6.55)  (0.80)  (1.04)  (1.13) 
Female*Overstayer ‐ 0.073 ‐ 0.008  0.025  0.020  0.014 
(0.90)  (0.10)  (0.35)  (0.29)  (0.20) 
Female*Crosser ‐ 0.174 ‐ 0.123 ‐ 0.022 ‐ 0.045 ‐ 0.043 
(2.04)  (1.30)  (0.26)  (0.53)  (0.49) 
Female ‐ 0.050 ‐ 0.134 ‐ 0.146 ‐ 0.138 ‐ 0.143 
(1.53)  (0.96)  (1.14)  (1.07)  (1.12) 
Age  0.036 ‐ 0.010 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.011 
(3.19)  (0.97)  (0.85)  (0.90) 
Age²/100 ‐ 0.043  0.008  0.007  0.008 
(2.95)  (0.57)  (0.51)  (0.54) 
Married  0.080  0.077  0.089  0.095 
(1.59)  (1.72)  (1.96)  (1.74) 
Number of Children  0.000 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.011 
0.00   (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
Female*Married ‐ 0.147 ‐ 0.082 ‐ 0.082 ‐ 0.082 
(1.90)  (1.19)  (1.20)  (1.19) 
Married*Number of Children  0.006  0.004  0.000  0.001 
(0.11)  (0.09)  0.00   (0.03) 
Female*Number of Children  0.028  0.008  0.004  0.003 
(0.52)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
Female*Married*Number of Children ‐ 0.020  0.005  0.007  0.010 
(0.36)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.20) 
Years of Education before Migration ‐ 0.007  0.002  0.003  0.002 
(1.11)  (0.31)  (0.46)  (0.38) 
Years of Education in the U.S.  0.035  0.012  0.013  0.013 
(2.29)  (0.86)  (0.93)  (0.89) 
Excellent English  0.177  0.026  0.017  0.015 
(2.82)  (0.50)  (0.31)  (0.27) 
Very Good English  0.086  0.058  0.065  0.061 
(0.98)  (0.73)  (0.83)  (0.79) 
Good English  0.104  0.015  0.008  0.010 
(2.12)  (0.35)  (0.18)  (0.22) 
Female*Years of Ed before Migration  0.014  0.009  0.009  0.009 
(1.41)  (0.99)  (0.98)  (1.05) 
Female*Years of Ed in the U.S.  0.007 ‐ 0.001  0.000  0.001 
(0.33)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
Female*Excellent English ‐ 0.051  0.018  0.018  0.017 
(0.53)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
Female*Very Good English  0.138  0.110  0.081  0.083 
(0.99)  (0.93)  (0.68)  (0.71) 
Female*Good English ‐ 0.077  0.022  0.031  0.025 41 
 
   Model Specification 
   1  2  3  4  5 
(1.04)  (0.34)  (0.48)  (0.38) 
Duration of Pre‐LPR Job  0.016 ‐ 0.029 ‐ 0.028 ‐ 0.028 
(2.42)  (3.94)  (3.91)  (3.88) 
Interval Between LPR and Interview  0.005  0.008  0.007  0.007 



























State  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.078  0.140  0.316  0.323  0.327 
Number of Observations  2,660 






Table A1.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Occupational Annual Earnings, Pre-LPR Status 
Period, and Change in Pre- to Post-LPR Periods, for Immigrants in the U.S. No More Than Five 
Years 
Time Period:  Pre‐LPR  Pre‐ to Post‐LPR 
Model Specification:  1  5  1  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job  0.007 ‐ 0.053  0.104  0.082 
(0.14)  (1.22)  (4.09)  (3.26) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job ‐ 0.164 ‐ 0.087  0.029 ‐ 0.019 
(2.35)  (1.66)  (0.90)  (0.57) 
Female*Overstayer ‐ 0.091 ‐ 0.033 ‐ 0.072 ‐ 0.066 
(1.62)  (0.69)  (1.99)  (1.82) 
Female*Crosser  0.005  0.037 ‐ 0.005  0.005 
(0.06)  (0.46)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Female ‐ 0.362 ‐ 0.266  0.022 ‐ 0.016 






































































State  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.135  0.448  0.011  0.071 
Number of Observations  2,781 
Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 
Model specification number refers to the specifications in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table A2.  
OLS Regression Results, Change in Log of Hourly Wages, Pre-to-Post LPR Status Periods, and 
Post-LPR Period; Pre-LPR Low-Skilled Occupation Sub-Sample 
Time Period:  Pre‐ to Post‐LPR  Post‐LPR 
Model Specification:  1  5  1  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR job  0.353 ‐ 0.143  0.283 ‐ 0.036 
(3.04)  (1.13)  (3.14)  (0.51) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR job  0.639 ‐ 0.257  0.309 ‐ 0.016 
(5.61)  (1.36)  (3.64)  (0.17) 
Female*Overstayer  0.139  0.228 ‐ 0.044  0.012 
(0.75)  (1.45)  (0.34)  (0.13) 
Female*Crosser ‐ 0.077  0.016 ‐ 0.214 ‐ 0.084 
(0.54)  (0.10)  (2.13)  (0.74) 
Female ‐ 0.143 ‐ 0.327 ‐ 0.130 ‐ 0.314 






































































State  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.131  0.463  0.134  0.481 
Number of Observations  498 
Note: The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 




Table A3.  
Sample Sensitivity Analysis, OLS Regression Results, Utilizing Occupational Annual Earnings 
for the NIS Wage Sub-Sample 
Time Period:  Pre‐LPR  Pre‐ to Post‐LPR 
Model Specification:  1  5  1  5 
Overstayer at Pre‐LPR Job ‐ 0.160 ‐ 0.145  0.186  0.100 
(2.95)  (3.81)  (6.21)  (3.49) 
Crosser at Pre‐LPR Job ‐ 0.371 ‐ 0.141  0.141 ‐ 0.015 
(4.35)  (3.17)  (4.29)  (0.38) 
Female*Overstayer  0.020  0.070 ‐ 0.079 ‐ 0.071 
(0.26)  (1.23)  (1.86)  (1.74) 
Female*Crosser  0.005  0.030 ‐ 0.024  0.016 
(0.05)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.31) 
Female ‐ 0.379 ‐ 0.388  0.024  0.067 
(4.41)  (5.68)  (0.97)  (1.03) 
Includes Controls for: 
Demographic Characteristics  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Human Capital  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Immigration/Employment Networks  Yes  Yes 
Includes Fixed Effects: 
State  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year of Arrival  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country of Origin  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐Squared  0.183  0.499  0.039  0.181 
Number of Observations  2,660 
Note: Model specification number refers to the specifications in Tables 7 and 8. The t-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors clustered around occupations. 
 
 